Abstract-Certificate-based encryption (CBE) is a new public key encryption paradigm which combines traditional PKI-based public-key encryption (PKE) and identity-based encryption (IBE), and preserves some of their most attractive features. CBE provides an efficient implicit certificate mechanism and allows a periodical update of certificate status. It eliminates third-party queries for the certificate status and simplifies the certificate revocation problem in the traditional PKI, while it solves the key escrow problem and the key distribution problem inherent in IBE. In this paper, we propose a new generic construction of CBE schemes from PKE and IBE, and prove it to be CCA-secure in the standard model. In our construction, we use an efficient one-time simulation-sound adaptive NIZK proof system as the security enhancing building block to guarantee the CCA-security of the generated CBE schemes. When compared to the previous method, the security requirements of the primitive encryption schemes in our construction are much weaker and the performance of the generated CBE schemes from our construction is much more efficient.
I. INTRODUCTION
In traditional public key cryptography (PKC), a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is used to provide an assurance to the user about the relationship between a public key and the identity of the holder of the corresponding private key by certificates. However, the need for PKI supporting certificates is considered the main difficulty in the deployment and management of traditional PKC. To simplify the management of the certificates, Shamir [21] introduced identity-based cryptography (IBC) in which the public key of each user is derived directly from certain aspects of its identity, such as an IP address or an e-mail address, and the corresponding private key is generated by a trusted third party called Private Key Generator (PKG). For a long while it was an open problem to obtain a secure and efficient identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme. Until 2001, Boneh and Franklin [5] presented the first practical and provably secure IBE scheme (BF-IBE) using the bilinear pairings on elliptic curves. The main practical benefit of IBC lies in greatly reduction of need for public key certificates. However, the PKG can generate the private keys of all its users, so private key escrow becomes an inherent problem in IBC. Moreover, private keys must be sent to the users over secure channels. It makes private key distribution a daunting task.
In Eurocrypt 2003, Gentry [13] introduced a new asymmetric encryption paradigm called certificate-based encryption (CBE), which combines IBE [21] and traditional PKI-supported public key encryption (PKE) while preserving some of their most attractive features. CBE provides an implicit certificate mechanism for a traditional PKI and allows a periodical update of certificate status. As in the traditional PKI, each user in CBE generates his own public/private key pair and requests a certificate from a CA. In CBE, a CA generates a certificate as in a traditional PKI and is responsible for pushing a fresh certificate only to the holder of the public key in each time period. A certificate in CBE has all the functionalities of a traditional PKI certificate, and is also acts as a partial decryption key. This additional functionality provides an implicit certificate so that the sender is not required to obtain fresh information on certificate status and the recipient can only decrypt the ciphertext using his private key along with an up-to-date certificate from its CA. The feature of implicit certificate allows us to eliminate third-party queries for the certificate status and simplify the public key revocation problem. Therefore, CBE can be used to construct an efficient PKI requiring fewer infrastructures. Furthermore, there is no key escrow problem (since the CA does not know the private keys of users) and key distribution problem (since the certificates need not be kept secret) in CBE.
A. Related Work
Since the introduction of CBE, there are different variants or improvements proposed in the literature later on. In the original work [13] , Gentry constructed the first construction of CBE scheme in the random oracle [4, 7] . Subsequently, there are different variants or improved schemes proposed in the literature later on [20, 12, 19, 18] . Meanwhile, the generic method to construct CBE scheme from general primitives also appeared. In 2004, Yum and Lee [22] provided a formal equivalence theorem among IBE, certificate-less public-key encryption (CL-PKE) [1] and CBE. They showed that IBE implies both CBE and CL-PKE by giving a generic construction from IBE to those primitives. However, Galindo et al. [11] pointed out that a dishonest authority could break the security of this generic construction. In fact, the generic construction proposed by Yum and Lee is inherently flawed due to a naive use of double encryption without further treatments. Lu et al. [16, 17] solved this problem by using the Fujisaki-Okamoto conversions [9, 10] and gave two methods to achieve generic CCA-secure CBE constructions in the random oracle model from PKE and IBE. In 2005, Al-Riyami and Paterson [2] gave an analysis of Gentry's CBE concept and repaired a number of problems in the original definition and security model for CBE. They also presented a generic conversion of CBE from CL-PKE and claimed that a secure CBE scheme could be constructed from any secure CL-PKE scheme using this conversion. Kang and Park [14] pointed out that their conversion was incorrect due to the flaw in their security proof. In [8] , Dodis and Katz gave generic techniques to build CCA-secure multiple-encryption schemes from PKE schemes which are individually CCA-secure. They claimed that their methods can be applied to an IBE and a PKE (instead of two PKEs) and to build CBE schemes without resorting to the random oracle model. However, their construction encrypts the messages in parallel by the encryption algorithms of IBE and PKE, which results in long ciphertext size. Moreover, their construction requires that the IBE scheme and the PKE scheme are both CCA-secure in their own security model, and needs two additional cryptographic schemes (a one-time signature scheme and a secret sharing scheme) to guarantee the security of the resulting schemes. Therefore, their method is low efficient.
B. Our Contribution
In this paper, we propose a new generic construction of CBE scheme which is provably CCA-secure in the standard model. Our generic construction is based on three general primitives: an IBE scheme, a PKE scheme and a one-time simulation-sound adaptive non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof system. It constructs CBE scheme by combining IBE and PKE in the sequence way and taking the NIZK proof system as the security enhancing building block. When compared with the Dodis-Katz generic construction in [8] , our generic construction is much more efficient. What is worth mentioning is that our generic construction only requires that the two basic building blocks (namely IBE and PKE) both satisfy the weak CPA-security, instead of CCAsecurity as in [8] .
C. Paper Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we briefly review some related background definitions. In section 3, we present a new generic construction of CBE scheme and prove it to be secure in the standard model. In section 4, we make a comparison of our generic construction and the method in [8] . The paper is concluded in Section 5.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly review some background definitions including CBE, PKE, IBE, and one-time simulation-sound adaptive NIZK proof system.
A. Certificate-Based Encryption
The definition and security model for certificate-based encryption are taken from [2] , where the original definitions given in [13] . A 2 's advantage in this game is defined to
Definition 2.
A CBE scheme is IND-CBE-CCA secure if no polynomial-time adversary has non-negligible advantage in either IND-CBE-CCA Game I or IND-CBE-CCA Game II defined above.
B. Public Key Encryption and Identity-Based Encryption
A (standard) PKE scheme PKE = (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) consists of three polynomial-time algorithms: The keygeneration algorithm KeyGen takes as input security parameter k and outputs a user's public/private key pair <upk, usk>. The probabilistic encryption algorithm Enc takes as input upk and a message M, and outputs a ciphertext C. The deterministic decryption algorithm Dec takes as input usk and a ciphertext C; it outputs a message M, or ⊥ if C is invalid. The standard and strongest notion of security of a PKE scheme is IND-CCA2 [3] .
An IBE scheme IBE = (Setup, Extract, Enc, Dec) consists of four polynomial-time algorithms: The probabilistic setup algorithm Setup takes as input security parameter k and outputs the PKG's master key msk that is kept secret and the master public key mpk. The key generation algorithm Extract takes as input msk and a user's identity id to return the user's private key pk. The probabilistic encryption algorithm Enc takes as input a user's identity id, the master public key mpk and a message M, and outputs a ciphertext C. The deterministic decryption algorithm Dec takes as input pk, the master public key mpk and and a ciphertext C; it outputs a message M, or ⊥ if C is invalid. The strongest notion of security of an IBE scheme is IND-ID-CCA [5] which is defined by Boneh and Franklin by extending the definition of IND-CCA2 of PKE to the IBE setting.
In this paper, we will use a PKE scheme which satisfies the IND-CPA security and an IBE scheme which satisfies the IND-ID-CPA security as two basic building blocks of the generic construction. The security notion IND-CPA is weak than the security notion IND-CCA2, and IND-ID-CPA is weak than IND-ID-CCA. The concrete definitions of the security notions of PKE and IBE can be found in [3] and [5] respectively.
C. One-Time Simulation-Sound Adaptive NIZK
In our paper, we will use an abstract notion of a onetime simulation-sound adaptive non-interactive zeroknowledge (NIZK) proof system as a building block. We refer the readers to [15] for the details about the concrete construction of such a NIZK proof system. Next, we present the definitions for adaptive NIZK proof system and one-time simulation-sound adaptive NIZK proof system which are taken from [15] directly. Definition 3. Assume that k is the security parameter and μ(k) is an unspecified negligible function. A pair of probabilistic polynomial-time machines (P, V) is an adaptive NIZK proof system for a language L if the following holds: (
The statement x to be proven is chosen.
(4) Output (x, r, π).
Definition 4. Let (P, V) be an adaptive NIZK proof system for a language L, and S = (S 1 , S 2 ) be a simulator for (P, V). Then, we say that (P, V, S) is one-time simulation-sound, if no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ) has non-negligible probability to succeed in the following experiment:
(
Adversary A 1 receives the reference string r and outputs a statement x for which it wants to see a proof, and state information a for A 2 .
Adversary A 2 receives the simulated proofπ, and outputs a statement x ' and a prrof
If there exists a simulator S such that (P, V, S) is onetime simulation-sound, then the adaptive NIZK proof system (P, V) is called a one-time simulation-sound adaptive NIZK proof system.
Ⅲ. AN EFFICIENT GENERIC CONSTRUCTION OF CERTIFICATE-BASED ENCRYPTION
In this section, we present an efficient and generic construction of CBE scheme. Our generic construction constructs CBE scheme by combining an IND-ID-CPA secure IBE scheme and an IND-CPA secure PKE scheme in the sequence way and taking a one-time simulationsound adaptive NIZK proof system as a security enhancing building block to guarantee the IND-CBE-CCA security of the resulting CBE scheme.
A. The Construction
We now present our generic construction of the IND-CBE-CCA secure CBE scheme. Let IBE = (Setup, Extract, Enc, Dec) be an IND-ID-CPA secure IBE scheme, PKE = (KeyGen, Enc, Dec) be an IND-CPA secure PKE scheme, and (P, V) be a one-time simulationsound adaptive NIZK proof system for the following NPlanguage:
and C 2 = PKE.Enc(PK 2 , M)}. That is, L is the language of pairs of ciphertexts and public keys, such that both ciphertext are encryptions of the same message. Then, an IND-CBE-CCA secure CBE scheme CBE = (Setup, SetKeyPair, Certify, Enc, Dec) can be constructed as follows:
Setup: This algorithm runs the algorithm IBE.Setup(k) to generate a mater key msk and the public system parameters params. The mater key and the public system parameters of the scheme CBE are set to be msk and params repectively.
SetKeyPair: This algorithm runs the algorithm PKE.KeyGen(k) to obtain two independent key pairs (PK 1 , SK 1 ) and (PK 2 , SK 2 ). Furthermore, it chooses a uniformly distributed reference string r of the correct length for the NIZK proof system (P, V). The public key of the user id is PK = (PK 1 , PK 2 , r) and the corresponding private key is SK = (SK 1 , SK 2 ) .
Certify (PK 2 , c) , and invokes the NIZK P upon (C 1 , C 2 , PK 1 , PK 2 ) with reference string r to obtain a proof π. Finally, it outputs the ciphertext C = (C 1 , C 2 , π).
Dec: In order to decrypt the ciphertext C = (C 1 , C 2 , π), this algorithm first runs the NIZK V to verify that π is an accepting proof for the statement (C 1 , C 2 , PK 1 , PK 2 ) with reference string r. If yes, it outputs either of IBE.Dec(params,
Cert τ , PKE.Dec(SK 2 , C 2 )).
B. Security
Next is our result about the security of the proposed generic construction. Firstly, from the zero-knowledge property of the NIZK proof system (P, V), we have that | 
:
Setup. The NIZK simulator S first runs IBE.Setup(k) to generate a mater key msk and the public system parameters params, then outputs msk and params to the adversary A 2 . Then, S chooses a simulator-generated reference r * for the public key in the IND-CBE-CCA secure CBE scheme CBE, runs PKE.KeyGen(k) to obtain two independent key pairs (PK 1 Firstly, from the zero-knowledge property of the NIZK proof system (P, V), we have that | Table 1 shows a detailed performance comparison of our generic construction and the Dodis-Katz construction [8] . As usual, all symmetric operations (the operations of the secret sharing scheme in the Dodis-Katz construction, the operations of the NIZK proof system in our construction) are ignored, due to their high computational efficiency. In Dodis-Katz construction, the encryption algorithm first "splits" the message into n pieces of the same length by a secret sharing scheme, then encrypts these pieces in parallel by the encryption algorithms of IBE or PKE, and generates a signature of the resulting ciphertexts by a one-time signature scheme. In the following comparison, we only consider the case where n = 2. We denote the signing algorithm and the verification algorithm in the signature scheme by (Sign, Vfy), the verification key and the signature by vk and σ.
From the table, we can see that the Dodis-Katz construction requires that the IBE scheme and the PKE scheme should both satisfy the CCA-security, while our construction requires that these two schemes both satisfy the CPA-security. As we know, the computational cost of the encryption algorithm or the decryption algorithm in the CCA-secure scheme is higher than the one in the corresponding CPA-secure scheme, and the length of the ciphertext in the CCA-secure scheme is longer than the one in the corresponding CPA-secure scheme. Moreover, the Dodis-Katz construction requires a one-time signature scheme to guarantee the CCA-security of the resulting scheme. Although one-time signatures are easy to construct in theory, and are more efficient than those signatures which are existentially unforgeable under an adaptive chosen-message attack, they still have their price. For example, one-time signatures based on the cryptographic hash functions have very long public keys and signatures, which would result in very long ciphertexts, and one-time signatures based on numbertheoretic assumptions yield schemes whose computational cost both for key generation and signing is more expensive [6] . Therefore, our generic construction is much more efficient than the Dodis-Katz construction either in the computational cost or the communicational cost, even being compared with the most efficient case of the Dodis-Katz construction where n = 2.
Ⅴ. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose an efficient and generic construction of CBE scheme from some general primitives and prove it to be IND-CBE-CCA secure in the standard model. It constructs CBE scheme by combining an IND-ID-CPA secure IBE scheme and an IND-CPA secure PKE scheme in the sequence way and taking an one-time simulation-sound adaptive NIZK proof system as the security enhancing building block. When compared with the Dodis-Katz construction, our generic construction is much more efficient due to the reduced computational and communicational cost, and ciphertext size. The result shows that CBE scheme can be constructed in a more general and efficient way in the standard model.
